Brief for the Appellee: Fifth Annual Pace National Environmental Moot Court Competition by Blake, Wendy L. et al.
Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 10
Issue 2 Spring 1993 Article 9
April 1993
Brief for the Appellant: Fifth Annual Pace National
Environmental Moot Court Competition
Widener University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Widener University School of Law, Brief for the Appellant: Fifth Annual Pace National Environmental
Moot Court Competition, 10 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 807 (1993)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss2/9
No. 92-21
IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPOSAL CORP. and
CLEANFILL SERVICES, INC.
Appellants,
V.
STATE OF NEW UNION
Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW UNION
BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANT*
C. Drue Chichi
Anthony F. Cantarella
EllenBeth Wachs-Augsberger
Widener University
School of Law
P.O. Box 7474, Concord Pike
Wilmington, Delaware 19803
(302) 477-2144
*This brief has been reprinted in its original form. No revisions have been made
by the editorial staff of the Pace Environmental Law Review.
807
1
808 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Does the hazardous waste interstate export ban enacted
by New Union in the New Union Hazardous Waste Self-'
Sufficiency Act violate the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution?
II. Is the hazardous waste interstate import ban enacted by
New Union in the New Union Hazardous Waste Self-Suf-
ficiency Act valid under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution?
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OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the United States District Court for the
District of New Union (Appellant App. 1) is unreported.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED
The provision at issue, the Commerce Clause, provides:
"The Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o regulate com-
merce with foreign nations and among the several States, and
with the Indian tribes." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant, Cleanfill Services, Inc. ("CSI") operates a haz-
ardous waste chemical treatment facility and landfill in
Maywood, North Hampshire ("Maywood facility"). Environ-
mental Disposal Corp. v. New Union, No. 92-538, slip op. at 2
(D.N.U. Apr. 23, 1992). The facility has all the necessary per-
mits under state and federal law to treat several types of haz-
ardous wastes.2 Id. at 3. The Maywood facility is able to treat
only waste generated in New Union. See Id.
Federal law strictly regulates the management of hazard-
ous waste facilities such as CSI's. The Environmental Protec-
tion Agency ("EPA") has promulgated regulations concerning
the treatment, transportation and disposal of hazardous waste
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976). These regulations
impose stringent requirements on generators, transporters,
and treatment, storage and disposal ("TSD") facilities in or-
der to ensure that hazardous wastes are handled in a manner
that minimizes health and environmental risks. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. §§ 6922-6925 (1976).
RCRA regulates TSD facilities in great detail. Under
RCRA, formal approvals must be obtained prior to construc-
tion of a TSD, and before any waste may be treated at the
facility. 40 C.F.R. § 270.1 (1991). A facility must also meet
federal standards concerning design requirements, location
standards, training of personnel, inspection of facilities, plans
to minimize the likelihood of an emergency, and responses to
an emergency. 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.1-264.1065 (1991). Addition-
ally, in 1984, Congress enacted amendments to RCRA, speci-
fying that disposal of hazardous waste in landfills is permitted
only after the waste is treated with the best available technol-
ogy in order to reduce the waste's toxicity and mobility. 42
U.S.C. § 6924(d)-(m) (1984).
2. Hazardous wastes are defined as materials which are either: (1) specifically
designated as "hazardous" by the Environmental Protection Agency; (2) are a mix-
ture of solid waste and designated hazardous substances; or (3) exhibit ignitability,
corrosivity, reactivity or toxicity. See 40 CFR §§ 261.3, 261.20-261.24, 261.30-261.33
(1991).
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Federal law regulates the transportation of hazardous
materials with equal vigor. See generally 49 U.S.C. app.
§§ 1801-1819 (1992). Packaging requirements, shipping con-
tainers and procedures for loading and unloading are all de-
tailed with specificity. 49 C.F.R. § 173.1-173.34 (1991). The
Department of Transportation also details explicit procedures
to be followed if the vehicle transporting the hazardous mate-
rial becomes disabled, is involved in an accident or if a
container holding the material leaks while in transit. 49 C.F.R.
§§ 177.853-177.861 (1991).
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657
(1980), encourages states to assure adequate capacity for dis-
posal of their own hazardous waste, either through in-state fa-
cilities or through interstate agreements. The statute does this
by conditioning receipt of federal CERCLA funding for reme-
dial measures upon a state's proof of adequate hazardous
waste disposal capacity. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (1991).
A state may forego implementation of a federal waste dis-
posal program and enact its own, provided that the require-
ments of the state plan are equal to or more stringent than
the federal regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1976); 40 C.F.R.
§ 271.1(i)(1) (1991). New Union has neither sought nor re-
ceived federal authorization from the EPA to implement the
federal RCRA. Environmental Disposal, No. 92-538 at 2. In-
stead, the state operates its own hazardous waste regulation
program under the New Union Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act. Id. at 2, 3.
The Act regulates the hazardous waste by-products of
several area manufacturing plants. Id. at 3. An unintended
by-product of certain manufacturing processes is an excep-
tionally lethal compound known as DBCP. Id. Accidental ex-
posure to a mere trace of DBCP causes immediate convul-
sions, and moments later, paralysis of the nervous system,
cardiopulmonary failure and death. Id. The only known anti-
dotes must be administered within minutes to spare the vic-
tim's life. Id.
The dangers inherent in the transport of DBCP have
been graphically demonstrated by an accident that occurred
1993]
9
816 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
in 1990. Id. A truck carrying a two gallon container of DBCP
from North Hampshire overturned just two miles from its
destination, Environmental Disposal Corporation's ("EDC")
facility in Springfield, New Union ("Springfield facility"). Id.
The container of DBCP ruptured, releasing the compound
into the environment. Forty cows on a nearby farm died from
the effects of the vapors that escaped. Id. The farmer, who
went to the scene to investigate, was also exposed to the va-
pors and immediately went into convulsions. Id. If the driver
of the truck, who survived the accident by donning protective
gear, had not administered the proper antidote to the farmer
immediately, the farmer would have died. Id. The New Union
Department of Emergency Response spent an estimated
$1,400,000 responding to the accident, and is now embroiled
in costly complex litigation in an attempt to recover the
cleanup costs. Id. at 3-4.
All of the significant generators of hazardous waste in
North Hampshire and South Hampshire produce waste that
contains DBCP. Id. at 3. Pure DBCP is a waste by-product of
five factories located in North Hampshire and South Hamp-
shire. Id. Under EPA regulations concerning disposal of haz-
ardous waste in landfills, any waste mixture containing even
trace amounts of DBCP must be incinerated using special
treatment technology. Id. EDC's Springfield facility is the
only facility in the tri-state region that possesses this technol-
ogy; therefore, it is the only facility in the region that can le-
gally accept and dispose of these wastes. Id.
At least seventy-five percent of the hazardous waste gen-
erated in New Union contains no DBCP. See Id. Fifty percent
of the hazardous waste generated in New Union is currently
disposed of in facilities in North Hampshire and South
Hampshire that cannot treat DBCP-tainted waste, and an ad-
ditional twenty-five percent is disposed of at facilities in New
Union that cannot treat waste tainted with the compound. Id.
It is undisclosed how much of the remaining twenty-five per-
cent of New Union's waste that is treated at the Springfield
facility contains the compound.
In response to the dangers posed by DBCP, the legisla-
ture held hearings to reevaluate New Union's policies regard-
[Vol. 10
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ing hazardous waste. Id. at 4. The legislature found that haz-
ardous waste is a threat to the health of New Union's citizens
and its environment, and that hazardous waste generated
outside of New Union is more dangerous to the public health
than waste generated within New Union. Id.; N.U. Code § 1
(1991). These findings prompted the state to enact the New
Union Hazardous Waste Self-Sufficiency Act ("NUHWSSA").
Environmental Disposal, No. 92-538 at 4. The stated policy
reason behind the enactment was to "seek[] hazardous waste
self-sufficiency." Id.; N.U. Code § 2 (1991). NUHWSSA con-
tains an export ban, providing that "no hazardous waste may
be transported from New Union to any other state," and an
import ban, providing that "no hazardous waste may be trans-
ported from any other state to New Union, whether for treat-
ment, storage, or disposal in New Union or any other state."
N.U. Code §§ 3, 4 (1991); Environmental Disposal, No. 92-
538 at 4.
EDC subsequently initiated a suit against New Union, al-
leging that Section Four of NUHWSSA, the import ban, vio-
lates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution,
and sought to enjoin its enforcement. Environmental Dispo-
sal, No. 92-538 at 5.
New Union countered EDC's allegations by defending
NUHWSSA in its entirety on the grounds that the statute is a
proper exercise of the state's police power. Id. Though the Act
contains no severability clause, New Union contended that if
the district court found Section Four to be invalid, then the
entire Act must be invalid. Id.
CSI then initiated a suit against New Union, alleging that
Section Three of NUHWSSA, the export ban, is invalid. Id.
New Union once again contended that the entire Act is valid.
Id. However, the state indicated that it would agree with CSI
that Section Three is invalid, but only if Section Four were
found to be invalid. Id.
After consolidating the two lawsuits, the district court
upheld NUHWSSA in its entirety. Id. at 5,6. The court found
that NUHWSSA is a balanced act that imposes the same level
of hardship on in-state and out-of-state generators of hazard-
ous waste. Id. at 6. Additionally, the court held that New
19931
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Union was justified in treating hazardous waste differently
than solid waste, specifically because it poses dangers to the
public health and environment that ordinary solid waste does
not. Id. Because the court upheld NUHWSSA in its entirety,
it did not need to decide whether the inclusion of one uncon-
stitutional provision in the Act would necessarily invalidate
the entire statute. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The provisions disputed in this action are Section Three
and Section Four of the New Union Hazardous Waste Self-
Sufficiency Act. Section Three provides that "no hazardous
waste may be transported from New Union to any other
state." N.U. Code § 3 (1991). Section Four provides that "no
hazardous waste may be transported from any other state to
New Union, whether for treatment, storage, or disposal in
New Union or any other state." N.U. Code § 4 (1991).
The Supreme Court has explicitly held that hazardous
waste is an article of commerce. Chemical Waste Manage-
ment, Inc. v. Hunt, - U.S. -, -, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2012 n.3
(1992). Therefore, the constitutionality of both the hazardous
waste export and import bans must be examined under the
auspices of the Commerce Clause.
In order to determine the constitutionality of a statute
challenged under the Commerce Clause, a court must first de-
termine whether the statute "regulates evenhandedly with
only 'incidental' effects on interstate commerce, or discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce either on its face or in prac-
tical effect." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
If this Court finds that the statute regulates evenhand-
edly, and imposes only an incidental burden on interstate
commerce, the local benefit conferred by the statute must out-
weigh the burden it places on interstate commerce in order for
the court to declare the statute valid under the Commerce
Clause' Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
However, if this Court determines that the statute is discrimi-
natory either on its face or in effect, it may declare the statute
constitutional only after examining it with the strictest scru-
[Vol. 10
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tiny. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337. "The state bears the burden of
justifying the discrimination by showing the following: (1) the
statute has a legitimate local purpose; (2) the statute serves
this interest; and (3) nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate
to preserve the legitimate local purpose, are not available."
Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 753
F. Supp. 739, 763 (S.D. Ind. 1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds, No. 92-1318 (7th Cir. Sept. 17, 1992).
Furthermore, if the statute is not only facially discriminatory,
but is a blatant attempt at "economic protectionism" through
economic isolation, the statute will be deemed unconstitu-
tional per se and stricken down without further inquiry. Phil-
adelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
Section Three of NUHWSSA, the hazardous waste inter-
state export ban, violates the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution. The export ban is discriminatory both on
its face and in effect, because it expressly promotes New
Union's economic interests above the national interest in the
free flow of commerce. It neither regulates evenhandedly, nor
imposes merely an incidental burden on interstate commerce.
Therefore, the provision is invalid per se, as its purpose is
solely to protect New Union's local economy. Additionally, it
advances no legitimate state purpose that cannot be achieved
by less restrictive means. Therefore, it cannot pass constitu-
tional muster under the strict scrutiny test and is invalid
under the Commerce Clause.
It is not always clear whether a statute is discriminatory
or regulates evenhandedly. Medigen of Kentucky, Inc. v. Pub-
lic Serv. Comm'n, 787 F. Supp. 590, 597 (S.D. W. Va.
1991)("Medigen I"). If this Court finds that New Union's ex-
port ban is not discriminatory, it must evaluate its constitu-
tionality using the standard set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc. See Chemical Waste, - U.S. at __, 112 S. Ct. at 2014
n.5; Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. In determining the constitutionality
of a neutral statute under the Commerce Clause, the Supreme
Court has adopted a balancing test: "Where the statute regu-
lates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public in-
terest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only inciden-
tal, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed upon such
19931
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commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits." Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
Even under this less stringent balancing test, Section
Three fails in its quest for constitutionality. An absolute ban
on the export of all hazardous waste is the most oppressive
burden that can be placed on interstate commerce. In order to
justify this devastating burden on interstate commerce, the
state must advance a benefit conferred by the export ban that
is so substantial that it overcomes this severe restriction. Id.
The state has advanced no such benefit; the only local benefit
stemming from the export ban is an economic one. Because
New Union's export ban offers no other putative local benefit
aside from an economic one, and the burden it places on in-
terstate commerce is not justified by its benefit, the provision
violates the Commerce Clause. Therefore, the decision of the
district court finding Section Three of NUHWSSA constitu-
tional is clearly erroneous.
However, the hazardous waste interstate import ban of
NUHWSSA is valid under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution. Although the import ban of
NUHWSSA is discriminatory on its face, it is a valid exercise
of the state's police powers to protect the health, safety and
welfare of its citizens. This interest in public health and safety
is a legitimate state interest that, in this instance, cannot be
served by a less discriminatory alternative. Therefore, the
provision survives the test of strict scrutiny and is valid under
the Commerce Clause.
It cannot be credibly disputed that New Union has a le-
gitimate interest in minimizing the critical danger to the pub-
lic health and welfare created by the mass transportation of
lethal hazardous waste into the state. Additionally, although a
state normally may not enact a statute which discriminates
against articles of interstate commerce, a statute which is
facially discriminatory will pass constitutional muster if the
state, can advance a legitimate reason, apart from the articles'
origin, to discriminate against the commerce. Philadelphia,
437 U.S. at 627. The increased risk associated with hazardous
waste generated outside of New Union that is not present
with hazardous waste generated locally affords the state a le-
[Vol. 10
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gitimate reason, apart from the origin of the waste, to discrim-
inate against the commerce.
Once a state advances a legitimate purpose to support its
restriction on interstate commerce, a court must then inquire
"whether alternative means could promote this local purpose
as well without discriminating against interstate commerce."
Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336. In the instant case, there are no less
discriminatory alternatives to mitigate the hazards of DBCP,
because one hundred percent of the hazardous waste imported
into New Union by North Hampshire and South Hampshire
contains DBCP. However, only a small amount, if any, of the
waste generated within New Union contains DBCP. There-
fore, the nature of the waste dictates that the restriction must
discriminate against hazardous waste generated outside of the
state in order to adequately protect the citizens of New
Union. Any alternative less restrictive than a complete ban
will not effectively accomplish this goal.
Because the health and safety of the citizens of New
Union constitutes a legitimate local purpose for the enactment
of the hazardous waste import ban, and there are no viable
less restrictive alternatives to achieve the same level of protec-
tion afforded by the import ban, Section Four of NUHWSSA
represents a legitimate exercise of the police power of the
state. Therefore, the district court was correct in holding that
the provision is valid under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution.
Section Three should be severed from NUHWSSA and
the remainder of the Act be deemed constitutional. A provi-
sion is severable if the remainder of the statute is fully opera-
tive as a law, and if there is evidence that the legislature
would have enacted the statute regardless of the presence or
absence of the provision. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480
U.S. 678, 684 (1987). NUHWSSA, absent the export ban, still
effectuates the legislative purpose of protecting the health and
safety of the citizens of New Union, and no provision of the
Act is dependent upon the export ban to give it meaning or
the full binding effect of law. Therefore, Section Three may
be severed without emasculating the remainder of the statute,
1993]
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and NUHWSSA, absent its export ban, may be deemed
constitutional.
ARGUMENT
Section Three of the statute disputed in this action, the
New Union Hazardous Waste Self-Sufficiency Act, provides
that "no hazardous waste may be transported from New
Union to any other state." N.U. Code § 3 (1991). As a blatant
attempt at economic protectionism, this hazardous waste in-
terstate export ban is discriminatory on its face, and violates
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution be-
cause it does not advance a local purpose for which there are
no less discriminatory alternatives.
Even if this Court finds that Section Three regulates
evenhandedly and imposes only an incidental burden on com-
merce, the provision fails a less rigorous test of constitutional-
ity because the burden it places on interstate commerce out-
weighs the putative local benefits it confers.
However, the district court was correct in holding that
Section Four of the NUHWSSA is valid under the Commerce
Clause. This provision states that "no hazardous waste may
be transported from any other state to New Union, whether
for treatment, storage, or disposal in New Union or any other
state." N.U. Code § 4 (1991). Because Section Four's import
ban serves a legitimate local purpose for which there are no
less restrictive alternatives, the provision survives the strict
scrutiny test and comports with the Commerce Clause.
Additionally, the Act is fully operative as a law without
Section Three, and there is evidence that the legislature
would have enacted NUHWSSA regardless of the presence or
absence of the provision. Therefore, the district court's failure
to find Section Three unconstitutional and sever it from the
remainder of the Act is clearly erroneous.
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I. THE HAZARDOUS WASTE INTERSTATE EXPORT
BAN OF THE NEW UNION HAZARDOUS WASTE
SELF-SUFFICIENCY ACT VIOLATES THE COM-
MERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTI-
TUTION.
The Supreme Court has explicitly held that hazardous
waste is an article of commerce. Chemical Waste, - U.S. at
-, 112 S. Ct. at 2012 n.3. Therefore, the constitutionality of
both the hazardous waste export and import bans must be ex-
amined under the auspices of the Commerce Clause.'
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution
provides that "Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o regu-
late commerce ... among the several States." U.S. Const. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3. The Clause was designed to promote "the theory
that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim to-
gether, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are
in union and not division." Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294
U.S. 511, 523 (1935). "It means that in the matter of inter-
state commerce we are a single nation- one and the same
people. All the states have assented to it, all are alike bound
by it, and all are equally protected by it." Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 596 (1923). To give effect to this
meaning, the federal courts of the United States have inter-
preted the Commerce Clause to possess a dual faceted power:
the express power conferred upon Congress to regulate inter-
state commerce between the states, and the implied power to
limit the states' ability to regulate interstate commerce. Ste-
phen D. DeVito, Jr. Trucking, Inc. v. Rhode Island Solid
Waste Management Corp., 770 F. Supp. 775, 779 (D.R.I.),
aff'd, 947 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir. 1991). This implied limitation
3. New Union merely leases the land on which the state's TSD facilities are lo-
cated, and charges the facilities' owners a percentage of their profits as rent. Environ-
mental Disposal, No. 92-538 at 3. New Union has no other connection with the facili-
ties or their owners. See Id. The fact that New Union leases the land to TSD facility
owners is not sufficient, by itself, to classify New Union as a market participant. Swin
Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 250 (3d Cir. 1989). Because
New Union is not a market participant, the constitutionality of NUHWSSA is not
exempt from evaluation under the Commerce Clause. See South-Central Timber
Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93 (1984).
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has been referred to as the "dormant" Commerce Clause. Id.
The dormant Commerce Clause's limitation on a state's
power may often conflict with a state's right to promulgate
laws protecting the health and safety of its people. Id. at 780-
81. In order to determine the constitutionality of a statute
posing an apparent conflict, a court must first determine
"whether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly, with
only 'incidental' effects on interstate commerce, or discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce either on its face or in prac-
tical effect." Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336.
If this Court finds that the statute regulates evenhand-
edly, and imposes only an incidental burden on interstate
commerce, the local benefit conferred by the statute must out-
weigh the burden it places on interstate commerce in order for
the court to declare the statute valid under the Commerce
Clause. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. However, if this Court deter-
mines that the statute is discriminatory either on its face or in
effect, it may declare the statute constitutional only after ex-
amining it with the strictest scrutiny. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337.
"The state bears the burden of justifying the discrimination
by showing the following: (1) the statute has a legitimate local
purpose; (2) the statute serves this interest; and (3) nondis-
criminatory alternatives, adequate to preserve the legitimate
local purpose, are not available." Government Suppliers, 753
F. Supp. at 763. Furthermore, if the statute is not only facially
discriminatory, but is a blatant attempt to promote "economic
protectionism" through economic isolation, the statute will be
deemed unconstitutional per se and stricken down without
further inquiry. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
A. The Hazardous Waste Interstate Export Ban vio-
lates the Commerce Clause because it is discrimina-
tory on its face, and does not advance a legitimate
local purpose that may be served by less restrictive
means.
Section Three of NUHWSSA, the hazardous waste inter-
state export ban, is both discriminatory on its face and in ef-
fect because it expressly promotes New Union's economic in-
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terests at the expense of the national economy. The provision
neither regulates evenhandedly nor imposes merely an inci-
dental burden on interstate commerce. To determine whether
the statute is constitutional, it must be examined with the
strictest scrutiny to determine whether the statute has a legit-
imate purpose that cannot be served by less restrictive means.
Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337. Because the sole purpose of the ex-
port ban is economic protectionism, it advances no legitimate
state purpose that cannot be achieved by less restrictive
means. See Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624. Therefore, it can-
not pass constitutional muster under the strict scrutiny test
and is invalid under the Commerce Clause.
The export ban, because it is a measure designed to block
the flow of commerce in order to promote economic protec-
tionism, is invalid per se. A statute is generally considered per
se invalid and stricken down without further inquiry when it
"directly regulates or discriminates against interstate com-
merce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests
over out-of-state interests . . ." Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579
(1986).
The export ban discriminates against interstate com-
merce on its face. A statute is facially discriminatory when it
allows a state to "plac[e] its parochial interests above the na-
tional interest in the free flow of interstate commerce." Haz-
ardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 766 F.
Supp. 431, 438 (D.S.C.), aff'd in part and remanded in part,
945 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1991). Section Three directly promotes
local parochial interests at the expense of interstate com-
merce, because enforcement of the export ban necessarily re-
sults in the treatment and disposal of all waste generated in
the state by facilities within the state. This creates an unfair
economic advantage for local waste treatment facilities. Out-
of-state facilities are denied the opportunity to offer their ser-
vices to generators in New Union, and local generators are un-
able to choose among several competitive treatment facilities,
or to procure these services at competitive prices.
The Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he clearest exam-
ple" of a facially discriminatory statute is one "that overtly
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blocks the flow- of interstate commerce at a State's borders."
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624. See also Waste Systems Corp.
v. County of Martin, 784 F. Supp. 641, 644 (D. Minn. 1992);
DeVito, 770 F. Supp. at 782.
Section Three of NUHWSSA explicitly provides that "no
hazardous waste may be transported from New Union to any
other state." N.U. Code § 3 (1991). This provision, a blanket
ban on the export of any and all hazardous waste, is an "overt
block" on the flow of interstate commerce. It is therefore dis-
criminatory on its face, and must be stricken down as per se
invalid without further inquiry. See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S.
at 579. However, even if the provision is not deemed per se
invalid, it must still be examined under the strict scrutiny test
to determine whether the provision advances a legitimate lo-
cal purpose that may not be served by less discriminatory
means. See Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336.
This is a case of first impression. Although several courts
have ruled on the constitutionality of export bans on solid
waste, no court has specifically addressed the constitutionality
of an export ban on hazardous waste. See, e.g., J. Filiberto
Sanitation, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 857
F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1988); DeVito, 770 F. Supp. 775; Harvey &
Harvey, Inc. v. Delaware Solid Waste Auth., 600 F. Supp.
1369 (D. Del. 1985). However, in Medigen I, a West Virginia
district court addressed the constitutionality of a state statute
that restricted the export of infectious medical waste.
Medigen I, 787 F. Supp. at 592-93. The statute required out-
of-state waste carriers to obtain a "certificate of convenience
and necessity" from the Public Service Commission of West
Virginia before operating within state boundaries. Id. at 592.
The district court determined that the statute placed a
direct burden on interstate commerce and therefore examined
its constitutionality under the strict scrutiny test. Id. at 600.
The defendant in Medigen I offered an argument similar to
that of New Union in the present action, contending that the
restriction on interstate commerce was necessary to protect
public health and safety. The Medigen I court rejected this
contention, stating:
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The argument that a state may serve the admittedly legit-
imate purpose of protecting the health, safety and welfare
of its citizens by suppressing competition has been
soundly rejected as being contrary to a basic ten[et] un-
derlying the Commerce Clause: "[E]very consumer may
look to the free competition from every producing area in
the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any."
Id. at 601 (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336
U.S. 59 (1949)).
The court ordered the parties to present further evidence
on the question of whether the statute served a legitimate
state purpose that could not be accomplished by less restric-
tive means. Medigen I, 787 F. Supp. at 601. After examining
the newly presented evidence, the court struck down the stat-
ute. Medigen of Kentucky, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 787
F. Supp. 602, 609 (S.D. W. Va. 1992)("Medigen I"). The
state contended that the statute was designed to protect the
public health and welfare; however, the court found the stat-
ute to be an ineffective and impermissible means of accom-
plishing this purpose. Id. The state could offer no convincing
evidence that the infectious waste either posed any particular
risk of disease transmission to the public, or that any risk of
transmission could not be eliminated by less restrictive
means. Id. at 607-08.
In assessing the statute's constitutionality, the court
found a significant economic purpose behind the enactment of
the statute. Id. at 605. Companies that had already obtained
authorization to transport infectious waste had an obvious in-
terest in thwarting potential competitors through the existing
certification system. Id. The state, on the other hand,
presented no evidence to demonstrate that an unburdened
economy would preclude the state from obtaining infectious
waste transportation services at competitive prices. Id. The
court, therefore, considered the absence of a legitimate state
purpose that could not be served by less restrictive means,
coupled with the statute's obvious economic purpose, and held
that the statute violated the Commerce Clause. Id. at 609.
New Union's hazardous waste export ban provision is
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analogous to the statute examined in Medigen I and H. Both
seek to regulate the transportation of a form of hazardous
waste across state lines. However, New Union asserts that an
outright ban on the transportation of hazardous waste out of
the state does not violate the Commerce Clause. Environmen-
tal Disposal, No. 92-538 at 5. Because a mere restriction on
the transportation of hazardous waste is sufficiently discrimi-
natory to be examined under the strict scrutiny test, the test
must necessarily be appropriate for an outright ban on the ex-
port of hazardous waste. Therefore, New Union must prove
not only that the export ban serves a legitimate state purpose,
but also that it is the least restrictive means available to serve
this purpose. See Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336-37.
New Union has advanced no such legitimate state pur-
pose for enacting the export ban. Their expressly stated pur-
pose in enacting NUHWSSA is to "seek[] hazardous waste
self-sufficiency." N.U. Code § 2 (1991). 4
In reality, however, the actual purpose and effect of the
New Union hazardous waste export ban is economic protec-
tionism. NUHWSSA contains a valid provision which bans
the import of all hazardous waste into the state for health and
safety reasons. N.U. Code § 4 (1991). The economic impact of
the import ban is to reduce the volume of hazardous waste
that can be treated at local facilities. To offset this economic
loss, New Union instituted an export ban to ensure an ade-
quate flow of waste into its facilities, thereby maintaining the
facilities' profitability. However, this is impermissible under
the Commerce Clause. A state may not restrict the flow of
commerce in order to confer an advantage on local economic
interests, therefore, the adverse economic impact created by
4. The state supports the validity of this proposition through reliance on the
policy reflected in Section 104(c)(9) of CERCLA, in which Congress mandated that
each state ensure sufficient capacity for disposal of its own hazardous waste in order
to qualify for federal funding. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (1991). See also N.U. Code § 2
(1991). Though a state may choose to secure sufficient disposal of its hazardous waste
through in-state facilities or interstate agreements, whatever method it chooses must
be constitutional. CERCLA's requirement that a state must provide for disposal of its
hazardous waste does not exempt the state's chosen method of compliance from ex-
amination under the Commerce Clause. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v.
South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 789-90 (4th Cir. 1991).
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the valid import ban cannot be used to justify the invalid ex-
port ban. See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire,
455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982) (holding that an export ban of elec-
tricity designed to gain an economic advantage is "precisely
the sort of protectionist regulation that the Commerce Clause
declares off-limits to the states"); Hughes, 441 U.S. at 338
(striking down a ban on the export of minnows as an economi-
cally protectionist measure "repugnant to the Commerce
Clause"); H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 535 (condemning
"economic restraints on interstate commerce for local eco-
nomic advantage").
The New Union export ban is virtually identical to the
ordinance addressed by a Minnesota district court in Waste
Systems. At issue in Waste Systems was an ordinance requir-
ing that all compostable solid waste generated within the
county be disposed of in a county facility. Waste Systems, 784
F. Supp at 642. The county explained that the ban was en-
acted to "assur[e] both the reliability and financial security of
[the Facility] . . . . Without an adequate supply of waste,
[the Facility] cannot be financially successful." Id. at 644-45.
The court found the ordinance to be discriminatory, be-
cause it was designed to "generate revenues to support the fa-
cility at the expense of discriminating against interstate com-
merce." Id. at 645. The court therefore examined the
ordinance using the strict scrutiny test, and found that it was
simply an exercise in economic protectionism. Id. Although
the state's goal of having a financially viable composting facil-
ity may have been legitimate, it was "not the type of compel-
ling purpose which permits interference with interstate com-
merce." Id. Therefore, the court held that the ordinance
imposed an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. Id.
The same fate must befall New Union's export ban. New
Union's purpose in enacting the export ban is simple eco-
nomic protectionism.. The purpose of the New Union statu-
tory provision, to ensure an adequate flow of waste into the
state's facilities, is identical to the purpose of the ordinance in
Waste Systems. See Id. at 644-45. The state has advanced no
other purpose for the export ban; therefore, it does not pass
constitutional muster and is invalid under the Commerce
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Clause.
However, even if this Court finds that New Union may
properly regulate interstate commerce in order to maintain
the economic viability of its in-state hazardous waste facili-
ties, an outright ban on the export of all hazardous waste is
not the least restrictive means available to accomplish this
goal.
New Union may ensure the economic viability of its haz-
ardous waste treatment facilities by making up the difference
between the cost of using the in-state facilities and the cost of
transporting the waste out of the state. See Id. at 645. By
eliminating the economic advantage of sending the waste out
of New Union, the state may encourage local generators to
utilize local facilities for treatment and disposal of their
waste.
The New Union export ban is discriminatory on its face
because it favors local economic interests over the national in-
terest by burdening interstate commerce. Courts have consist-
ently held that economic protectionism, the export ban's sole
purpose, is insufficient to burden interstate commerce. See
New England Power, 455 U.S. at 339; Hughes, 441 U.S. at
338; H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 535. Even if this Court
finds that economic protectionism is a legitimate purpose, less
restrictive means of accomplishing this purpose are available.
Because Section Three, a ban on the export of all hazardous
wastes, does not meet the standards of constitutionality under
the strict scrutiny test, it is invalid under the Commerce
Clause. Therefore, the district court's decision upholding the
provision's constitutionality is clearly erroneous.
B. The Hazardous Waste Interstate Export Ban vio-
lates the Commerce Clause because the burden it
imposes on interstate commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits.
It is not always clear whether a statute is discriminatory
or regulates evenhandedly. Medigen I, 787 F. Supp. at 597. If
this Court finds that New Union's export ban is not discrimi-
natory and imposes only an incidental burden on interstate
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commerce, the constitutionality of Section Three must be
evaluated using the standard set forth in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc. In determining whether a neutral statute is con-
stitutional under the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court
has adopted a balancing test: "Where the statute regulates
even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. If this Court finds that New Union's
economic interest is a legitimate purpose for the export ban,
"the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the
burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the na-
ture of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities."
Id.
Even under this less stringent balancing test, the statute
fails in its quest for constitutionality. The burden that the
New Union export ban places on interstate commerce out-
weighs any benefit that may be conferred upon local economic
interests.
The burden of Section Three, an absolute ban on the ex-
port of any hazardous waste, is the most oppressive burden
that can be placed on interstate commerce. The ramifications
of enacting such a burden are devastating to the free flow of
commerce in the tri-state region, and to CSI in particular.
Virtually all the hazardous waste generated in New
Union, North Hampshire, or South Hampshire is treated and
disposed of in one of the three states. Environmental Dispo-
sal, No. 92-538 at 2. CSI owns and operates a hazardous waste
treatment facility and landfill in Maywood, North Hampshire.
Id. This facility does not have the capability of treating
DBCP-tainted waste. See Id. at 3. Though every significant
source of hazardous waste from North Hampshire or South
Hampshire is tainted with DBCP, at least seventy-five per-
cent, if not more, of New Union's hazardous waste is not
tainted with DBCP. See Id. Therefore, New Union is essen-
tially the only significant source of waste that can be
processed at the Maywood facility. If the export ban is de-
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clared constitutional, the Maywood facility will be forced out
of business, specifically because it is unable to treat any waste
except that which originates from New Union.
Not only will CSI, as the owner of an existing facility, be
forced out of business, but an absolute ban on the export of
hazardous waste forecloses the possibility of any other com-
petitor opening a facility in North Hampshire or South
Hampshire that does not treat DBCP-tainted waste. The ban
also revokes a New Union generator's right to choose any fa-
cility, regardless of its location, that may offer similar services
at prices more competitive than those in New Union.
In order to justify this devastating burden on interstate
commerce, the state must advance a putative local benefit
conferred by the export ban that is so substantial that it over-
comes this severe restriction. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. The state
has advanced no such benefit; the only local benefit stemming
from the export ban is an economic one.
In Tenneco, Inc. v. Sutton, 530 F. Supp. 411 (M.D. La.
1981), a Louisiana district court examined regulations that
impeded the interstate flow of natural gas to determine
whether a local economic benefit was sufficient to outweigh
the burden the regulations placed on interstate commerce.
The court expressly concluded that the regulations, which
could have caused the interstate market to be "completely de-
prived of natural gas[,]
. . . cause[d] an onerous burden on interstate commerce and
operate[d] to defeat the purpose of the Commerce Clause.
Therefore, even assuming a legitimate purpose, the Louisiana
provisions unduly burden[ed] interstate commerce." Id. at
442.
If an economic benefit is insufficient to validate a mere
regulation that might operate to deprive the interstate market
of commerce, an economic benefit will certainly be insufficient
to validate an outright ban on the export of goods. Therefore,
Section Three fails the less stringent balancing test, because it
offers no other putative local benefit aside from an economic
one, and the burden it places on interstate commerce exceeds
this economic benefit. Consequently, Section Three is a viola-
tion of the Commerce Clause, and the district court's finding
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that the provision is constitutional is clearly erroneous.
II. THE HAZARDOUS WASTE INTERSTATE IMPORT
BAN OF THE NEW UNION HAZARDOUS WASTE
SELF-SUFFICIENCY ACT IS VALID UNDER THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION.
Because Section Four of NUHWSSA, the hazardous
waste interstate import ban, is discriminatory on its face, the
provision must be examined with the strictest scrutiny to de-
termine whether it is a valid exercise of the state's police pow-
ers to protect the health, safety and welfare of its citizens. It
is subject to the same inquiries as the export ban: Whether it
serves a legitimate purpose, and whether this purpose may be
achieved by less restrictive means. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336-
37. New Union has a critical interest in safeguarding the
health and safety of its citizens. Additionally, the nature of
the hazardous waste at issue renders the public health a legiti-
mate state interest that cannot be served by a less discrimina-
tory alternative. Therefore, Section Four, NUHWSSA's haz-
ardous waste import ban, survives the test of strict scrutiny
and is valid under the Commerce Clause.
A. The Hazardous Waste Interstate Import Ban serves
a legitimate state purpose.
The hazardous waste originating outside of New Union is
significantly different than waste generated locally, because
virtually all of the hazardous waste generated outside of the
state is, by the very nature of its composition, exceptionally
lethal to the citizens of New Union. See Environmental Dis-
posal, No. 92-538 at 3. It cannot be credibly disputed that
New Union has a legitimate interest in minimizing or, if possi-
ble, eliminating the critical danger to the public health and
welfare created by the mass transportation of this lethal haz-
ardous waste into the state.
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1. Protection of the health and safety of the citizens
of New Union is a legitimate state purpose.
The Supreme Court of the United States has expressly
held that protecting the health and safety of its citizens is a
legitimate state purpose for enacting an import ban. Maine v.
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986). In Maine, the Supreme
Court of the United States addressed the constitutionality of
an import ban that was promulgated by the State of Maine
for public health and safety reasons. Id. The statute at issue
sought to ban the import of all baitfish because the imported
fish may have contained parasites and non-native species that
had the potential to destroy native wildlife. Id. at 132, 141.
The Court noted that the Commerce Clause's limitations
on state regulatory power are not absolute. Under the author-
ity of its general police power, a state may " 'regulate matters
of "legitimate local concern," even though interstate com-
merce may be affected.' " Id. at 138 (quoting Lewis v. BT Inv.
Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980)). The Court found that
the import ban was discriminatory on its face and examined
the statute with the strictest scrutiny to determine whether it
had a legitimate local purpose that could not be served by less
discriminatory means. Maine, 477 U.S. at 138. Maine was able
to demonstrate a legitimate local purpose through evidence
that the imported baitfish posed two serious threats to native
fisheries and their ecosystems: parasites and the introduction
of non-native species. Id. at 141. Also, there were no satisfac-
tory alternatives to ensure that the baitfish were free of para-
sites. Id. at 146. Therefore, the statute survived the test of
strict scrutiny and was valid under the Commerce Clause. Id.
at 151-52.
Since its decision in Maine, the Supreme Court has re-
peatedly affirmed that a discriminatory statute may be "justi-
fied by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism."
New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274
(1988). See also Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michi-
gan Dep't of Natural Resources, - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2019
(1992); Chemical Waste, __ U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2009. A seri-
ous health and safety concern may be just such a valid factor.
Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue and Fin., -
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U.S. -, __, 112 S. Ct. 2365, 2372 (1992).
In Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434 (1880), the Court ex-
pressly held that "[i]n the exercise of its police powers, a
State may exclude from its territory . . . any articles which, in
its judgment, fairly exercised, are prejudicial to the health or
which would endanger the lives or property of its people." Id.
at 443. Recently, the Supreme Court acknowledged this con-
cept in the context of hazardous waste, stating that protection
of the health and safety of the public from toxins, conserva-
tion of the environment, and a reduction of the amount of
noxious waste travelling on the state's highways are all legiti-
mate local interests. See Chemical Waste,_ U.S. at -, 112
S. Ct. at 2014. Additionally, in Maine, the Supreme Court ex-
pressly held that
[A state] has a legitimate interest in guarding against im-
perfectly understood environmental risks, despite the
possibility that they may ultimately prove to be negligi-
ble. "[T]he constitutional principles underlying the com-
merce clause cannot be read as requiring [a state] to sit
idly by and wait until potentially irreversible environ-
mental damage has occurred . . . before it acts to avoid
such consequences."
Maine, 477 U.S. at 148 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 585
F. Supp. 393, 397 (D. Me. 1984), rev'd, 752 F.2d 757 (1st Cir.
1985), rev'd sub nom. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
The circumstances surrounding the enactment of New
Union's import ban are analogous to the dilemma that faced
the state in Maine. The hazardous waste originating outside
of New Union is significantly different than waste generated
locally, because virtually all of the hazardous waste generated
outside of the state is, by the very nature of its composition,
exceptionally lethal to the citizens of New Union. See Envi-
ronmental Disposal, No. 92-538 at 3. Virtually all of the haz-
ardous waste currently imported into New Union contains an
exceptionally lethal compound known as DBCP. Id. New
Union has a critical interest in preventing DBCP-tainted haz-
ardous waste from crossing its borders. Accidental exposure to
a mere trace of DBCP causes immediate convulsions, and mo-
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ments later, paralysis of the nervous system, cardiopulmonary
failure and death. Id. The only known antidotes must be ad-
ministered within minutes to spare the victim's life. Id.
This danger is not merely speculative; it was graphically
demonstrated in a near fatal incident that occurred in 1990.
Id. A truck carrying a single two-gallon container of DBCP, en
route from North Hampshire to EDC's Springfield facility,
overturned on a New Union highway. Id. The container rup-
tured, releasing DBCP into the environment. Id. A citizen of
New Union was exposed to the vapors and went into convul-
sions. Id. If not for the timely administration of an antidote to
DBCP, he would have died. Id. The incident cost New Union
$1,400,000 in cleanup costs, and the state is currently em-
broiled in costly complex litigation in an attempt to recover
these costs. Id. at 4. Because DBCP-tainted waste poses criti-
cal dangers to the health and safety of the citizens of New
Union, the state has a legitimate purpose for enacting the im-
port ban.
2. The increased risk of harm associated with the
DBCP-tainted hazardous waste is a legitimate
reason, apart from its origin, to discriminate
against the waste.
Though a state normally may not enact a statute which
discriminates against articles of interstate commerce, a dis-
criminatory statute will pass constitutional muster if the state
can advance a legitimate purpose, apart from the articles' ori-
gin, to discriminate against the commerce. Philadelphia, 437
U.S. at 627. In the instant case, the critical health and safety
risks posed by DBCP-tainted waste constitutes a legitimate
reason, apart from the waste's origin, for enacting New
Union's import ban.
In Philadelphia, the Supreme Court invalidated a New
Jersey statute that prohibited the importation of most solid or
liquid waste that originated outside of the state. Id. at 629.
The Court acknowledged that New Jersey had a legitimate
purpose in protecting the state's economy and environment;
however, it found that the waste originating outside the state
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contained essentially the same components as the local waste.
Id. Therefore, because there was no basis for discriminating
against waste originating outside of the state, the statute was
held invalid as an impermissible restriction on interstate com-
merce. Id.
Since its decision in Philadelphia, the Supreme Court has
invalidated facially discriminatory restrictions upon the im-
port of hazardous waste only when the state could advance no
legitimate reason for treating the waste that was generated
outside of the state differently from the waste that was gener-
ated locally. See Fort Gratiot, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at
2027; Chemical. Waste, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2017. But
see Maine, 477 U.S. at 151-52 ("[T]he record suggests that
Maine has legitimate reasons, 'apart from their origin, to treat
[out-of-state baitfish] differently.' ").
The increased risk associated with the waste generated
outside New Union that is not present with hazardous waste
generated locally differentiates New Union's import ban from
the ban addressed in Philadelphia. All of the significant
sources of waste entering New Union from North Hampshire
and South Hampshire are, at the very least, tainted with
DBCP. Environmental Disposal, No. 92-538 at 3. Further-
more, five significant sources of hazardous waste generate
pure DBCP as a by-product. Id. However, at least seventy-five
percent of the waste generated within the boundaries of New
Union does not contain any DBCP whatsoever. See Id. Be-
cause the waste generated outside of New Union poses signifi-
cantly different and greater risks to the populace than the
waste generated within New Union, the state is justified in
treating the waste generated outside of the state differently
than that generated locally.
The cases addressing so-called "quarantine laws," ban-
ning the import of noxious substances into a state, compel the
same conclusion. Though some courts have mistakenly held
that "innately harmful articles 'are not legitimate subjects of
trade and commerce,'" Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622 (quoting
Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. R.R., 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888)),
the Supreme Court dispelled this notion in Philadelphia, stat-
ing that
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[a]ll objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause
protection; none is excluded by definition at the outset. In
Bowman and similar cases, the Court held simply that be-
cause the articles' worth in interstate commerce was far
outweighed by the dangers inhering in their very move-
ment, States could prohibit their transportation across
state lines.
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622.
It is undisputed that a state may legally prohibit the im-
port of noxious or dangerous materials that will subject its cit-
izens to a "measurable, identifiable harm." Government Sup-
pliers, 753 F. Supp. at 765. Waste tainted with DBCP is just
such a noxious material. DBCP is an exceedingly dangerous,
potentially lethal substance, and the dangers associated with
the compound have been graphically identified. See Environ-
mental Disposal, No. 92-538 at 3. Therefore, it is a legitimate
target of a quarantine ban.
In several cases, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
quarantine cases to hold that a quarantine law must ban all
traffic in noxious articles, whatever their origin. See generally
Chemical Waste, - U.S. at ., 112 S. Ct. at 2016-17 &
nn.10-11. However, as applied to New Union's import ban,
this interpretation is illogical.
In Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439 (1939), the seminal
quarantine case, the Supreme Court upheld a statute banning
the transport of dead animals across state lines. It cannot seri-
ously be proposed that this statute regulated evenhandedly
without regard to the dead animal's origin. According to the
Supreme Court's interpretation in Chemical Waste, in order
to be valid, the Indiana statute at issue in Clason must have
banned all transport of animals that died in the state, as well
as those that died out of state. See Chemical Waste, - U.S.
at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2016-17 & nn. 10-11. Logically, Indiana's
legislature could not possibly have intended to ban the trans-
port of dead animals within the state, for there would then be
no way to transport an animal that had died in the state to a
proper disposal facility, regardless of whether that facility was
located either in the state or outside of the state. According to
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the interpretation in Chemical Waste, the citizens of Indiana
would have had to simply leave their animals at the location
of their deaths in order to comply with the law.
Chemical Waste's interpretation of the quarantine cases,
applied to the facts at bar, would compel an equally absurd
result. If this Court were to hold that NUHWSSA, in order to
be valid under the Commerce Clause, must ban transportation
of hazardous waste within the state, any local generator of
DBCP-tainted waste would be forbidden to transport that
waste to any disposal facility located either inside or outside
of New Union. Therefore, generators would be forced to sim-
ply allow the waste to accumulate untreated at the generation
site. This is a completely unacceptable danger to the public
health and safety.
The more logical interpretation of the quarantine cases,
consistent with Clason, is that which accepts that New Union
may legitimately ban the transport of noxious articles into the
state in order to protect the public health and safety, yet still
allow any small amount of DBCP-tainted waste generated in
New Union to be transported to a proper treatment facility.
DBCP is present in every significant source of waste gen-
erated outside of New Union, while very little, if any, of the
waste generated within New Union contains the compound.
Environmental Disposal, No. 92-538 at 3. DBCP is a highly
noxious substance which poses potentially lethal dangers in its
transport; therefore, the import ban protects the health and
safety of New Union's citizens and environment. This is a le-
gitimate state purpose that is sufficient to justify the import
ban under the Commerce Clause.
B. There are no less discriminatory alternatives availa-
ble that will accomplish New Union's legitimate
purpose as effectively as the Hazardous Waste In-
terstate Import Ban.
Once a state advances a legitimate purpose to support its
restriction on interstate commerce, the court must then in-
quire "whether alternative means could promote this local
purpose as well without discriminating against interstate com-
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merce." Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336. In the instant case, there are
no less discriminatory alternatives that will safeguard the
health and safety of New Union's citizens and environment
against the hazards of DBCP as effectively as a ban on the
import of waste generated outside of the state.
The most significant hazards of DBCP lie in its transpor-
tation. Those who are involved in either the generation or the
disposal of DBCP are highly trained in emergency response
procedures. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120(b), 1910.120 (8)(iii) (1991).
Therefore, any accident that occurs at a generation or disposal
site will be handled in the safest manner possible with a mini-
mal risk of harm to people and the environment. However,
there is a substantial risk to both people and the environment
when a truck transporting DBCP is involved in an accident on
the open road. Properly trained emergency response personnel
may not be immediately available. In addition, although the
driver of a truck transporting DBCP must be trained in emer-
gency response procedures, 49 C.F.R. §§ 177.800(b), 177.853-
177.861 (1991), there is a serious risk that he will be incapaci-
tated in an accident. Furthermore, even if he is in possession
of his faculties, it is unlikely that he alone will be able to ef-
fect an adequate response to an accident of any significant
magnitude.
An accident on the open road has the potential of expos-
ing countless numbers of innocent bystanders to DBCP va-
pors, including the occupants of any other car involved in the
accident, occupants of cars that come upon the accident site,
local police and emergency personnel responding to the acci-
dent, motorists who may stop to offer assistance, and curious
onlookers.
The law of averages dictates that the greater the amount
of DBCP transported on New Union's highways, the greater
the likelihood that an accident of catastrophic magnitude will
occur.5
5. Accidents occurring during the transport of hazardous waste are not uncom-
mon. According to Department of Transportation statistics, there were 9,052 reported
unintentional releases of hazardous materials during transportation in 1991. Hank
Walshak, The Move Is On To Cut Incidents Involving Hazardous Materials, ECON,
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There is no less restrictive alternative to mitigate this
danger, because virtually one hundred percent of the hazard-
ous waste imported into New Union by North Hampshire and
South Hampshire contains DBCP. Environmental Disposal,
No. 92-538 at 3. However, only a minor amount, if any, of the
waste generated within New Union contains DBCP. See Id.
Therefore, the nature of the waste dictates that the restriction
must discriminate against waste generated outside of the state
in order to adequately protect the citizens of New Union. Any
alternative less restrictive than a complete ban will not effec-
tively accomplish this goal.
In Chemical Waste, one of the two most recent cases in
which the Supreme Court addressed restrictions on hazardous
waste, the Court offered three alternatives to the discrimina-
tory tax enacted by the Alabama legislature: "a generally ap-
plicable per-ton additional fee on all hazardous waste dis-
posed of within [the state]," a per-mile fee that must be paid
by all vehicles transporting hazardous waste on the state's
highways, or a cap on the amount of hazardous waste disposed
of at any given facility. Chemical Waste, - U.S. at -, 112
S. Ct. at 2015. However, none of these alternatives would ef-
fectively protect the citizens of New Union from the hazards
of DBCP.
If New Union were to enact an economically reasonable
per-ton or per-mile fee on all hazardous waste transported
into or within New Union, it would fail to significantly reduce
the flow of DBCP-tainted waste transported within the state.
Because New Union houses the only facility in the tri-state
area that is capable of disposing of DBCP-tainted waste, local
and out-of-state generators would still find it less costly to use
New Union's facility than to transport the waste elsewhere for
treatment and disposal. Any fee sufficiently exorbitant to
make it more economical for generators not located within
New Union to transport the waste outside of the tri-state re-
gion would have the same effect on local generators. It would
then be more economically feasible for local generators to
Nov. 1992, at 14.
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transport their waste out of the tri-state region for disposal;
therefore, the flow of DBCP-tainted waste transported within
New Union will not be stemmed, its direction will simply be
reversed.
A limit on the amount of DBCP-tainted waste that may
be treated at New Union's facility will have the same effect as
per-ton or per-mile fees. Though some local generators may
be permitted to treat their waste at New Union's facility,
other local generators must then transport their DBCP-
tainted waste out of the tri-state area. Therefore, the stream
of DBCP-tainted waste upon the highways will not be affected
and the monumental risks associated with its transport will
not be alleviated.
Because the health and safety of the citizens of New
Union constitutes a legitimate local purpose for the enactment
of the hazardous waste import ban, and there are no viable
less restrictive alternatives to achieve the same level of protec-
tion afforded by the ban, Section Four of NUHWSSA repre-
sents a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state.
Therefore, the district court was correct in holding that the
provision is valid under the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution.
III. SECTION THREE OF THE NEW UNION HAZARD-
OUS WASTE SELF-SUFFICIENCY ACT IS SEVERA-
BLE FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT BE-
CAUSE THE ACT IS FULLY OPERATIVE AS LAW
ABSENT SECTION THREE.
NUHWSSA is fully operative as a law without Section
Three, and there is evidence that the legislature would have
enacted the statute regardless of the presence or absence of
the section. Therefore, the export ban should be severed and
the remainder of the Act be deemed constitutional.
Simply because one provision of a statute is unconstitu-
tional, it is not necessarily true that the entire statute does
not pass constitutional muster. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S.
641, 652 (1984). In fact, the Supreme Court has noted that in
reviewing a statute's constitutionality, "a federal court should
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act cautiously. A ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the
intent of the elected representatives of the people. Therefore,
a court should refrain from invalidating more of the statute
than is necessary." Id.
Although the standard for the severability of an unconsti-
tutional provision of a state statute is generally a question of
state law, in Alaska Airlines, Justice Blackmun noted that the
standard is "well established: 'Unless it is evident that the
Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are
within its power, independently of that which is not, the inva-
lid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a
law.'" Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684 (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976)).
Although determining whether a provision is severable
from a statute is generally an inquiry into the legislature's in-
tent, there is a "strong presumption" in favor of severability.
Sugarloaf Citizens Ass'n, Inc. v. Gudis, 573 A.2d 1325, 1333
(Md. App. 1990). Accord Regan, 468 U.S. at 653.
The legislature of New Union did not expressly include a
clause in NUHWSSA stating that Section Three is severable
from the remainder of the Act. Environmental Disposal, No.
92-538 at 5. Therefore, this Court must consider the purpose
of the statute and the intent of New Union's legislature to
determine whether the unconstitutional provision is severable.
The intent and purpose of the legislature in enacting NUHW-
SSA is reflected in the Findings and the Policy sections of the
Act itself. N.U. Code §§ 1, 2 (1991). Section One states that
"[t]he New Union legislature finds that hazardous waste is a
threat to human health and the environment. . . .The legis-
lature further finds that hazardous waste originating outside
of New Union is more dangerous to human health and the
environment than waste originating inside New Union." N.U.
Code § 1 (1991). In order to ameliorate the increased risk
posed by the waste originating outside New Union, the legisla-
ture enacted NUHWSSA to attain hazardous waste self-suffi-
ciency. N.U. Code § 2 (1991).
The purpose of the Act, protection of the public health
and safety, remains intact if Section Three is severed from
NUHWSSA. Section Three was enacted solely as an economi-
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cally protectionist measure designed to place New Union's lo-
cal interests above the national interest in the free flow of
commerce. It is Section Four, the provision banning the im-
port of all hazardous waste, that is New Union's sole means of
protecting the public health and safety. The import ban pre-
vents the influx of DBCP-tainted waste, and therefore mini-
mizes the potential of exposing and endangering the public
through the hazards of DBCP.
NUHWSSA is fully operative as a law without Section
Three's export ban, because the intent of New Union's legisla-
ture is still effectuated if the export ban is stricken. Addition-
ally, no provision of the Act is dependent upon Section Three
to give it meaning or the full binding effect of law. Therefore,
Section Three of NUHWSSA may be severed without emascu-
lating the remainder of the statute, and the Act, absent its
export ban provision, is constitutional.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant, Cleanfill Services,
Inc., respectfully requests that the decision of the United
States District Court for the District of New Union upholding
the constitutionality of New Union Code Section Three be
REVERSED, and the district court's decision upholding the
constitutionality of New Union Code Section Four be
AFFIRMED.
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